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ABSTRACT 
Imagine that you have been entrusted with private data, such as 
corporate product information, sensitive government 
information, or symptom and treatment information about 
hospital patients. You may want to issue queries whose result 
will combine private and public data, but private data must not 
be revealed, say, to the prying eyes of some insurance fraudster. 
GhostDB is an architecture and system to achieve this.   
You carry private data in a smart USB device (a large Flash 
persistent store combined with a tamper and snoop-resistant 
CPU and small RAM). When the key is plugged in, you can 
issue queries that link private and public data and be sure that 
the only information revealed to a potential spy is which queries 
you pose and the public data you access. Queries linking public 
and private data entail novel distributed processing techniques 
on extremely unequal devices (standard computer and smart 
USB device) in which data flows in only one direction: from 
public to private. This demonstration shows GhostDB’s query 
processing in action. 
1. MOTIVATION 
Traditional security procedures do not offer sufficient protection 
against data theft [4]. Recent academic work does provide 
additional guarantees under specific assumptions regarding 
where the trust resides in the system. Hippocratic databases 
ensure that personal data are used in compliance with the 
purpose for which the donor gave his consent [2] but require the 
database server to be trusted. Encrypted databases require either 
trusting the server [7] or the clients [6] depending on the place 
decryption occurs. Entire databases can also be hosted in secure 
hardware [8][10] but this solution applies only to small mono-
user databases. Finally, an alternative solution can be 
anonymizing the data [9] at the price of lesser data accuracy and 
usability. 
  
We propose a different approach to protecting sensitive data, 
recognizing that truly private data is a small portion of all the 
data that may be of interest in an application. The basic idea is 
to remove all sensitive data from internet-accessible places and 
allocate that data to trusted devices with strong guarantees 
against spying, much stronger than a spyware-prone laptop. We 
do this with minimal changes to schema definitions and no 
changes to the SQL query text.  
2. HIDDEN vs. VISIBLE 
In the specific demo scenario, we imagine that a user Bob has 
been entrusted with sensitive health data about diabetes patients 
in a hospital. The security administrator has declared certain 
sensitive columns to be “hidden” (should never be revealed to 
the public) and other columns to be “visible” (may be public, or 
at least visible to general hospital personnel). This is done 
through standard create table commands except that some field 
definitions have the extra keyword “hidden”. For example: 
CREATE TABLE Visit ( 
VisID INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, 
Date DATE, 
Purpose CHAR(100) HIDDEN, 
DocID REFERENCES Doctor(DocID) HIDDEN, 
PatID REFERENCES Patient(PatID) HIDDEN); 
Primary keys as well as visible fields can be stored at any place, 
like a public server or a personal computer and are therefore 
vulnerable to snooping (see left part of Figure 1). The hidden 
fields are hosted by Bob’s USB device (in the circle in figure 1) 
and then protected from any form of spying. The primary keys 
of all tables are replicated in the USB device to allow for 
queries combining visible and hidden data. In the demonstration 
scenario, we make foreign keys hidden because they offer the 
possibility of linking sensitive records, but different choices 
may make sense in other contexts. The USB device is assumed 
to be initially loaded in a secure setting. 
Hidden
 
Figure 1.  GhostDB mode of operation. 
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GhostDB works as follows. Queries are issued on the personal 
computer and visible data is found on the PC and/or on remote 
server(s). Visible data enters the USB device but all executions 
involving hidden data or the combination of hidden and visible 
data occur on the USB device. Neither hidden data nor 
intermediate results ever leave that device.  
In eventual deployment Bob needs a secure rendering platform. 
This could be the USB device itself (some smart memory sticks 
already hold a small LCD screen), possibly improved by 
technologies such as fiber carbon [5]. This could also be an 
external palm-style screen or tablet connected to the key or even 
the screen of the terminal the key is plugged into if a secure 
channel can be established with the video card (Digital Right 
Management companies are investigating this solution). Another 
mode of operation is sending the result to a remote secure 
application through a secure socket connection. Whichever the 
choice, the net effect is that Bob reveals to a potential spy only 
the queries he poses and the visible data he accesses. 
Queries linking public and private data entail novel distributed 
processing techniques on extremely unequal devices (standard 
computer and smart USB device). Beyond experiencing the 
benefit of the GhostDB approach in terms of data privacy, the 
visitor to this demonstration will see these processing techniques 
in action and assess their performance. In the sequel, we first 
recall from [1] the hardware constraints introduced by the USB 
device and the indexing and query processing techniques 
proposed to tackle them. Then we detail the demonstration 
scenario. 
3. SMART USB DEVICE CHALLENGE 
GhostDB acquires its tamper resistance from a smart USB 
device. As pictured in Figure 2, a smart USB device is a 
combination of a secure chip with a large external Flash 
memory (Gigabyte sized). The secure chip is usually equipped 
with a 32 bit RISC processor, memory modules composed of 
ROM, static RAM (tens of KB), a small quantity of internal 
stable storage and security modules. Security factors imply that 
the RAM must be small – the smaller the silicon die, the most 
difficult it is to snoop or tamper with processing. The Flash 
memory itself exhibits asymmetric costs for reads and writes. 
Writes are between 3 to 10 times slower than reads depending 
on the portion of the page to be read (full page vs. single word) 
and writes in place are precluded. Finally, the USB2.0 full speed 
communication throughput reaches 12 Mb/s. High speed (up to 
480 Mb/s) is envisioned for future platforms to cope with 
applications like on-the-fly video decryption. 
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Figure 2.  Smart USB device. 
These hardware constraints lead (1) to delegate as much work as 
possible to the PC and the server as long as this processing does 
not compromise hidden data, and (2) to design query processing 
techniques accommodating the tiny RAM and the Flash 
write/read cost ratio. 
4. INDEXING AND QUERY PROCESSING 
The smart USB device challenge introduced above transforms 
the privacy preservation problem into a severe performance 
problem. The problem is twofold: (1) how to compute regular 
SQL queries (concentrating here on SPJ queries) over arbitrarily 
large tables under such hardware constraints and (2) how to mix 
visible and hidden computations efficiently.  
In [1], we show that the first part of the problem leads to 
unacceptable performance with last resort join algorithms (like 
hash joins) as well as with known indexing techniques like join 
indices. We then proposed a new indexing model inspired by 
data warehouse techniques [11]. We illustrate this indexing 
model on the database schema presented in Figure 3. This 
schema, which will be used for the demo, is a tree schema in 
which each patient visit is managed by a specific doctor and 
prescriptions of medicine are given at each visit. The arrows of 
Figure 3 represent foreign key relationships and attributes 
having a superscript H in the schema are hidden. 
We propose a set of generalized join indexes known as “Subtree 
Key Tables” or SKT. There are two SKTs in the Figure: one 
rooted at Prescription and one at Visit. Each SKT joins all tables 
in the subtree to the subtree root with the IDs sorted based on 
the order of IDs in the root table. For example, the SKT rooted 
at Prescription has PreID, MedID, VisID, DocID, PatID and is 
sorted based on PreID. This enables a query to directly associate 
a prescription with the patient to whom it was issued, for example. 
To speed up selections, we propose an additional index that we 
call a “climbing index”. A climbing index on a lower table T in 
the tree-based database schema maps values to lists of 
identifiers from T as well as lists of identifiers for each table T’ 
that is an ancestor of T in the tree. For example, the entry for 
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Figure 3.  Database schema and SubTree Key Tables. 
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Figure 4.   Climbing indexes. 
“Spain” in the Doctor.Country index is associated with a list of 
Doctor identifiers, as usual, and also a list of Visit identifiers 
and a list of Prescription identifiers to precompute the joins with 
all tables in the path from Doctor to the root table Prescription 
(Figure 4). Combined together, SKTs and climbing indexes 
allow selecting tuples in any table, reaching any other table in 
the path from this table to the root table in a single step and 
projecting attributes from any other table of the tree. This 
benefit in terms of performance and RAM usage comes at an 
extra cost in terms of Flash storage. 
Let us now illustrate how SKTs and climbing indexes are used 
to execute queries mixing visible and hidden data efficiently, 
like: 
SELECT 
Med.Name, Pre.Quantity, Vis.Date 
FROM Medicine Med, Prescription Pre, Visit Vis 
WHERE  
Vis.Date > 05-11-2006 /*VISIBLE*/ 
AND Vis.Purpose = “Sclerosis” /*HIDDEN*/ 
AND Med.Type = “Antibiotic”  /*VISIBLE*/ 
AND Med.MedID = Pre.MedID  
AND Vis.VisID = Pre.VisID; 
The most intuitive Query Execution Plan (QEP) is pushing 
selections before joins, as usual, and performing all joins by 
index. This Pre-filtering strategy consists in: (1) using the 
climbing index on Vis.Purpose to deliver the list of PreID 
associated to the value ‘Sclerosis’, (2) delegating the selections 
on Vis.Date and Med.Type, receiving the two resulting lists of 
VisID and MedID from outside and transforming these lists into 
lists of PredID thanks to the climbing index on Vis.VisID and 
Med.MedID, (3) merging all these PreID lists and finally 
(4) accessing the SKT_Prescription to get the resulting tuples. 
For the sake of conciseness, we refer the reader to [1] for an 
explanation of the final project operation.  
If, however, the selectivity of a visible selection is low, 
traversing the climbing indexes may be a poor choice. An 
alternative is placing such selections after the hidden joins, as 
illustrated in Figure 5. This Post-filtering strategy is effective if 
the filtering can be done in a single pass over the result of the 
hidden joins. To meet this requirement, we use Bloom filters. 
The Bloom filter is a probabilistic bit array data structure that is 
used to test whether an element is a member of a set [3]. The 
two properties of Bloom filters are compactness and a very low 
false positive rate, making them well adapted to RAM-
constrained environments. 
Depending on the selectivities, a Pre-filtering or Post-filtering 
strategy can be selected per predicate. In addition, the 
selectivities of visible and hidden selections can be combined 
(Cross-filtering) before accessing a climbing index (resp. before 
building a Bloom filter). Note also that the selectivity of a 
selection on intermediate tables of the join tree can be combined  
with the selectivity of selections on hidden attributes of 
descendant tables thanks to the climbing properties of the 
indexes. This leads to a large panel of candidate plans based on 
Pre-filtering, Post-filtering and Cross-Pre/Post-filtering. 
5. DEMONSTRATION SCENARIO 
The demonstration platform is an instance of the architecture 
presented in Figure 1. A first PC is used to host the public server 
and show traces of queries sent to it. A second PC hosts the 
client application, an applet downloaded from the USB device, 
and plays the role of the user’s terminal. This application can 
open connections with the public server and with the USB 
device. A third PC represents the USB device itself and serves 
as a secure display. The GhostDB prototype currently runs on a 
software simulator of the USB device and will be ported on the 
real hardware as soon as it is delivered to us by Gemalto, our 
industrial partner. Anyway, the demonstration GUI must run on 
a software simulator because the hardware device is by design 
unobservable. 
We use a synthetic dataset compliant with the schema described 
in Figure 3. The cardinality of the root table (Prescription) is 
one million tuples.  
A demo visitor interacts with the demo platform in three phases: 
1. Checking security: see what is transferred among the three 
components of the platform during query execution. 
2. Testing query engine: evaluate alternative query execution 
plans and operators internals. 
3. … and playing a game: find the fastest plan for a query, 
with a prize to the best optimizer. 
The target of the first phase is to present the rationale of the 
approach and show the benefits of GhostDB in terms of  privacy 
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Figure 5.  Post-filtering query execution plan. 
 
 
protection. First, we visualize the hidden and visible part of the 
database. Then, while running a query, the interface reveals 
what a pirate (e.g., Trojan horse) would observe, snooping the 
data transferred between the components of the architecture. 
The second phase of the demo focuses on the novel query 
execution strategies tackling both the hardware constraints of 
the USB device and the combination of predicates on visible and 
hidden attributes. For a given query, the GUI allows the 
comparison of the relative performance of Pre-filtering and 
Post-filtering strategies in terms of RAM consumption and 
processing time (left upper side of Figure 6). To this end, the 
GUI helps building ad-hoc query execution plans, by easily 
modifying the ordering of high-level operators. A click on any 
plan operator (central part of Figure 6) displays a popup with 
additional statistics about this operator (number of processed 
tuples, local RAM consumption and processing time). 
The last phase of the demo invites the visitors to assess their 
ability to select the best plan for a simple query. The rather 
unusual query execution strategies implemented in GhostDB 
may generate unexpected results for newcomers. 
6. DEMO CONTRIBUTIONS 
This demo makes three contributions: (i) it shows an 
architecture to achieve strong guarantees of data privacy using a 
small database on a RAM-limited but tamper-resistant USB 
device; (ii) it shows how to make this architecture achieve good 
performance through novel data structures and query processing 
strategies; and (iii) it allows the user to modify the query 
processing strategies to get insight into database computation on 
USB devices. Because the flash memory environment is 
increasingly popular, we think our techniques and the demo will 
be of general interest. 
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Figure 6.  Building and evaluating ad-hoc query plans. 
